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punitive damages, Ellerin v. 
Fairfax, clarifies the relation-
ship between two seemingly 
settled areas of law. The law, 
its elements, and the standards 
by which it is measured, are in 
constant need of refinement and 
interpretation. However, 
whereas the standard for pu-
ni ti ve damages in a fraud ac-
tion is more focused, the value 








of the court's dicta, on exces-
sive punitive damages, is un-
known. The lack of an author-
itative judicial decision may fur-
ther confuse the issue. Adding 
another variable to the equation 
does not solve the problem. 
However, consideration ofleg-
islative policy may lay the foun-
dation for an effective judicial 
tool regarding the reasonable-
In a case of first impres-
sion, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a paternity 
action brought by a mother, then 
dismissed with prejudice, does 
not necessarily bar a subsequent 
paternity action brought by the 
child. Of even more impor-
tance, the court's ruling inJes-
sica G. v. Hector M, 337 Md. 
388, 653 A.2d 922 (1995) 
broadly construed Family Law 
Code, section 5-1038(b), to al-
low the modification or setting 
aside of all paternity orders ex-
cept declarations of paternity. 
Thus, even an order terminat-
ing litigation, such as a dis-
missal with prejudice, can be 
set aside and the paternity issue 
relitigated by the child's subse-
quent paternity action. 
In March 1985, Joyce 
G. and Hector M. had an inti-
mate relationship. In Decem-
ber of that same year, Joyce 
gave birth to Jessica G. Soon 
after Jessica's birth, Joyce filed 
a paternity action against Hec-
tor in the Circuit Court for 
Harford County. Blood tests of 
the three parties indicated that 
there was a 99.97% chance that 
ness of punitive damages 
awards. 
Nevertheless, given the 
precarious political climate, at 
the state and national level, con-
cerning tort reform and puni-
tive damages, it is encouraging 
that the issue of excessive puni-
tive damages has entered the 
judicial discussion. 
- Terrence J Daly 
Hector was Jessica's father. 
Nonetheless, Hector refused to 
admit paternity. Aftertwoyears 
of prolonged discovery, Joyce 
asked to stop the paternity ac-
tion. A consent order to dis-
miss the action with prejudice 
was drafted and signed by all 
parties but Joyce. When the 
Assistant State's Attorney ex-
plained the meaning of with 
prejudice, Joyce refused to sign 
the order. However, in March 
1988, the State's Attorney dock-
eted the consent order. 
Joyce tried repeatedly 
to continue the paternity action. 
She filed another paternity suit 
in the Family Court of New 
York. The New York court 
dismissed the action, relying 
solely on the 1988 Harford 
County dismissal with preju-
dice. While Joyce was pursu-
ing various avenues of appeal, 
Jessica filed a paternity action 
against Hector in the Circuit 
Court for Harford County. 
Hectorresponded by fil-
ing a motion to dismiss Jessi-
ca's action based on the doc-
trineofresjudicata. Thecircuit 
court found that Joyce was rep-
-~- ----~--
resenting Jessica's interests in 
the original paternity suit. Thus, 
it held that Joyce's original suit 
barred Jessica's subsequent pa-
ternity suit. Jessica appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland granted cer-
tiorari prior to the intennediate 
court's consideration of the is-
sue. 
The court of appeals 
began its analysis by noting that 
other jurisdictions have ruled 
on the issue of whether a child 
can bring a paternity action af-
ter the mother's unsuccessful 
action. Usually such actions 
were decided on res judicata 
principles. Jessica, 337 Md. 
at 395,653A.2dat926. Notic-
ing a split in authority among 
thesejurisdictions, the court ex-
plored the alternative conclu-
sions. 
Initially, the court dis-
cussed the jurisdictions support-
ing the conclusion that any un-
successful paternity action 
brought by a mother has a pre-
clusive effect on any subsequent 
paternity action brought by the 
child. Id. at 397, 653 A.2d at 
927. The court noted the ratio-
nale for barring a child's subse-
quent action, as espoused by 
the Indiana Court of Appeals in 
T.R. v. A. W by Pearson, 470 
N.E.2d 95, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1984). That court stated four 
reasons for not allowing a child 
to relitigate a mother's unsuc-
cessful paternity action. To 
begin, allowing successive pa-
ternity actions would under-
mine the court's goal of a final 
judgment. Secondly, courts dis-




ments. Relitigation of the pa-
ternity action would invite in-
congruous results. A third con-
cern voiced by the Indiana court 
was the need to avoid harassing 
litigation. Finally, the court 
noted that failing to apply the 
doctrine of res judicata would 
result in wasted time and court 
costs. Id. 
Next, the court of ap-
peals analyzed the jurisdictions 
adopting the opposite conclu-
sion. The majority of these 
decisions involved prior pater-
nity actions where the merits of 
the case were never actually 
litigated. Id. at399,653 A.2dat 
928. In quoting Johnson v. 
Hunter, 447 N.W.2d 871, 877 
(Minn. 1989), the court of ap-
peals noted that if the child's 
specific interests were not ad-
dressed on the merits in the first 
action, a subsequent paternity 
action was available to that 
child. Id. at 400, 653 A.2d at 
928. 
However, the court of 
appeals noted that it need not 
address the issue of a factual 
adjudication. Id. Rather, in the 
case sub judice, the resolution 
turned on the construction of 
Family Law Code, section 5-
1 038(b): "Except for a declara-
tion of paternity, the court may 
modify or set aside any order or 
part of an order under this sub-
title as the court considers just 
and proper in light of the cir-
cumstances and in the best in-
terests of the child." Id. 
In construing the stat-
ute, the court turned to the words 
ofsection5-1038(b). Thecourt 
detennined that the statute was 
clear and the intent obvious. 
Thus, the court interpreted this 
section to allow "a paternity 
court to modify or set aside any 
prior order where just and prop-
er and in the best interests ofthe 
child, regardless of the usual 
rules of finality applicable to 
non-paternity cases." Id. at401, 
653 A.2dat929. The court held 
that the order which dismissed 
Joyce's paternity action with 
prejudice was exactly the type 
of order contemplated by the 
statute. Since the prior order 
was dismissed by the State's 
Attorney over Joyce's objec-
tion and blood tests showed a 
99.97% probability of pat ern i-
ty, the court found it to be just 
and proper, and in the best in-
terests of Jessica to allow her 
subsequent paternity action to 
proceed. Id. at 402,653 A.2d at 
929. 
The court of appeals 
bolstered its opinion by stating 
that the holding reached was 
justified, even in the absence of 
Family Law Code, section 5-
1 038(b). First, the majority of 
other jurisdictions would not 
bar a child's subsequent pater-
nity action if the mother's orig-
inal action was dismissed with-
out a factual finding on the is-
sue of paternity. Id. Further-
more, to hold otherwise would 
directly contradict the public 
policy enunciated in the pater-
nity statute. That is, to promote 
the best interests ofillegitimate 
children and impose the respon-
sibility of parenthood on the 
parents of such children. Id. 
However, thecourtcau-
tioned that the analysis of the 
case sub judice cannot end with 
the holding. Noting that the 
New York dismissal with prej-
udice was based on the Harford 
County dismissal with preju-
dice and not a factual determi-
nation of the paternity issue, the 
court of appeals turned to Mary-
land's conflict oflaws. It found 
that the res judicata effect given 
to the New York dismissal with 
prejudice must be the same ef-
fect that New York would have 
given the judgment. A brief 
review of New York law re-
vealed aholding consistent with 
the holding reached by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
Id. at 404, 653 A.2d at 930. 
Thus, the Maryland court hon-
ored the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Id. at 405,653 A.2d at 
931. 
In the concurring opin-
ion, Justices Eldridge and Rak-
er stated that section 5-1007 of 
the Family Law Code (exempt-
ing paternity actions from rules 
and statutes dealing with proce-
dure unless such application is 
practical under the circumstanc-
es) provided enough authority 
for not applying res judicata to 
the case sub judice. Id. at 409-
10,653 A.2d at 933. Further-
more, the justices agreed with 
jurisdictions which hold that res 
judicata does not bar a paternity 
action brought byachild subse-
quent to an unsuccessful action 
brought by the mother. Id. at 
411,653 A.2d at 933-34. The 
justices noted that the child has 
different interests than a parent 
in paternity actions. Id. at 411, 
653 A.2d at 934. Thus the 
parties are not in privity and res 
judicata cannot apply. Id. 
In Jessica G. v. Hector 
M, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland explicitly refrained 
from holding that a child's sub-
sequent paternity action is not 
barred by a previous, unsuc-
cessful paternity action. How-
ever, the court left open an av-
enue of relief. Through a broad 
interpretation of Family Law 
Code, section 5-1038(b), the 
court can offer relief as it sees 
fit. This decision is a godsend 
to the children of those mothers 
who are unsuccessful in their 
paternity actions. As long as 
the order in the original paterni-
ty action is not a declaration of 
paternity, the child has a chance 
at maintaining his or her own 
paternity action against the pu-
tative father. While this might 
appear to be a decision that will 
open the floodgates of litiga-
tion, in reality, it merely offers 
the fatherless child a more equi-
table chance at initiating a pa-
ternity action. 
- Kristin Heller Woolam 
